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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case:

Appellant GoDaddy.com, LLC ("Go Daddy") files

this Interlocutory Appeal (the "Appeal"), seeking reversal of the trial court's denial
of its motion to dismiss the claims contained in the First Amended Petition filed by

Appellees Hollie Toups, Marissa Deitz, Marissa Jeffcott, Marianna Taschinger,
Caitlyn LaGrone, Meeghan Falls. Corina Lumrnus, Kelsi Goog, Kinsey Staudt,
Jessica Dupuy, Ashley Martin, Jillian Howard, Mallory Petry, Laramie Gilbert,

Taylor Barnwell, Particia Hinson, Margaret Noble, and other similarly situated
persons ("Appellees") on the basis that (1) Appellees' allegations demonstrate that
each and every claim contained therein is barred by the immunity afforded to Go

Daddy as a provider of Internet services as codified in Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230); and (2) Appellees failed to

allege facts that, if true, are sufficient to state a claim against Go Daddy under
Texas law.

Trial Court:

Hon. Buddie J. Hahn, 260lh Judicial District Court, Orange

County, TX.
Date of Order Appealed:

Party that Desires Appeal:

Appellate Court:
Party Filing Notice:

June 13, 2013

GoDaddy.com, LLC

Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont, Texas.
GoDaddy.com, LLC

Accelerated Appeal:

This appeal is an accelerated appeal under Rule 28.1

of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure because it is an appeal of an
interlocutory order pemiitted by statute. This is not a parental termination or a
child protection case as defined in Rule 28.4.
Not A Restricted Appeal:
No Indigency:

This is not a restricted appeal.

Go Daddy is not indigent.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue 1:

Whether

immunity

under

Section

230

of

the

Communications Decency Act bars each of the claims asserted against Go

Daddy as a matter of law based on the admission by Appellees that Go
Daddy did not control, create, develop, or publish the content at issue.
Issue 2:

Whether, as a matter of law, Appellees have alleged facts

that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal presents the Court with two questions of law. As such,
the Court's review of the trial court's ruling is de novo. El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 1999) ("Because

the issue ... is a question of law, our review is de novo.").
With regard to the underlying legal standard, Rule 91a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to dismiss a complaint where the
causes of action therein have no basis in law or fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91 a.1.

No basis in law means "the allegations,, taken as true, together with
inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the

relief sought." Id. No basis in fact means "no reasonable person could
believe the facts pleaded." Id.
Because Rule 9la is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the case law interpreting that statute is also instructive. As relevant
here, to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain "enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d

868 (2009). Of equal import is the corollary that allowing leave to amend is
futile if a further amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss

or if the claim is frivolous. Clauder v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 805 F. Supp.

445^ 447 (E.D. Tex. 1992)("Where the proffered amended complaint would
be futile, in that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
leave to amend may be denied.")

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is one of the most diverse forums for individual

communication ever developed.

In its short life, the Internet has moved

from the province of technical specialists and educational institutions into a
powerful force in the everyday lives of most Americans, allowing them to
share, discuss, and develop ideas in their political, professional, and personal

lives. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed more than 15 years ago, "[i]t is

no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
852 (1997) (citation and internal quote omitted). Not surprisingly, the scope

and depth of legal protections for Internet service providers play a direct role
in whether and how speech develops online.

In 1996, Congress passed Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act ("Section 230"), taking a deliberate, affirmative step to protect
speech online by broadly shielding Internet service providers from
responsibility under any state law relating to material supplied by their users.
In enacting Section 230, Congress made the policy decision that liability for
harmful online content should be imposed on the actual wrongdoers—that is,

the originators of the harmful content—and not the providers of interactive
computer sendees.

Assuming (as required for purposes of this appeal) that the allegations

asserted by Appellees in the First Amended Petition are true, this case arises
from circumstances in which a series of unidentified individuals came into

possession of sexually explicit photographs of Appellees, and without
Appellees' consent or permission, uploaded those photographs onto an
Internet website that was established and operated by Defendant Hunter

Thomas Taylor at TEXXXAN.COM.

Go Daddy was named in this matter

because the unidentified individuals and the owner of the website at issue

used Go Daddy's interactive computer services to make the allegedly illegal
photographs available on the Internet.

Based on Appellees' own allegations, Section 230 immunity applies
to Go Daddy with full force here. Appellees do not allege, nor can they, that
Go Daddy participated in the creation or publication of the allegedly

unlawful photographs of Appellees that are the subject of this lawsuit. Nor
do Appellees allege any involvement by Go Daddy in the operation of the
website at TEXXXAN.COM. Instead, Appellees admit that Go Daddy was

sued solely in its capacity as an online intermediary for the allegedly
harmful content of others.

As demonstrated in the trial court, both the plain language of Section

230 and well-established precedent render Go Daddy immune as a matter of

law from civil liability for the claims asserted by Appellees. Liability for the
unlawful content rests on the actual publishers and creators of the content,

each of whom may be sued for harm caused by any unlawful content they
produced and disseminated.

In attempting to hold Go Daddy liable for conduct and content that it
neither created nor published, Appellees seek to undermine the clear

protections afforded by Section 230. In essence, Appelles allege that the
statute's protections do not apply to Go Daddy because it failed to
voluntarily undertake to identify, remove, and/or block the content at issue.
If the position advanced by Appellees was adopted, it would provide an
avenue for other litigants to make an end run around the bright line

protections provided by Section 230, jeopardizing Internet service providers
and the Internet itself in the process.

Fortunately, the Court need not decide this appeal on the basis of
policy.

Although an Internet service provider may fall outside the

protections of Section 230 where it directly "creates" or "develops" content,
Appellees' admission that Go Daddy neither controlled nor had any
involvement in the creation, development, or publication of the offending
content at issue conclusively establishes Go Daddy's entitlement to the
immunity afforded by Section 230.

This Court should reject Appellees* effort to erode the protections
afforded to Internet service providers by Section 230 and reverse the trial
court's ruling.

Even if this Court somehow finds that immunity under Section 230

does not apply to Go Daddy in this case, the trial court's ruling must still be
reversed. The only arguably cognizable claim asserted by Appellees against

Go Daddy is one for civil conspiracy. Appellees fail, however to offer any
allegations to support the elements required to maintain such a claim. Even
more problematic for Appellees, however, is the fact that under Texas law,
civil conspiracy is a derivative tort. As discussed more fully herein, because

Appellees fail to state a separate underlying claim upon which relief may be
granted, their claim for civil conspiracy necessarily fails. As a matter of
law, Appellees fail to state a claim under Texas law against Go Daddy.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The events at issue in this case began when Appellees discovered that
photographs of themselves had been uploaded and posted by unidentified third

parties to a website entitled TEXXXAN.COM. ICR 18 at f 11] Defendant Hunter
Taylor

owned

and

operated

TEXXXAN.COM,

which

made

Appellees'

photographs and other personal information available to website subscribers. [CR
18 at ^[ 11] Appellees allege that their photographs and other personal information
were uploaded and posted on TEXXXAN.COM without consent or permission.
[CR 22 at 117]

Defendant Go Daddy is the world's largest domain name registrar, with over

54 million domain names under management.

[CR 41]

In addition to offering

registration services, Go Daddy offers website hosting services to its customers.
[CR 41] By way of background, the contents and images of any website on the
Internet are contained in the form of electronic files that reside on a

server

physically located at the site of the entity providing the hosting services for the
particular website. [CR 41] When an Internet user visits a particular website, a
series of computer interactions allow for the hosting provider to serve to the
website the requested content or images.

[CR 41]

This service by the hosting

provider is an interactive computer service that is vital to the proper operation of
the Internet. [CR41]
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For a monthly fee, Go Daddy provides computers to host content for its
users' websites. [CR 42] When content is hosted by Go Daddy, it resides on Go

Daddy's servers and may be accessed via the Internet. [CR 42] Although Go
Daddy's services are invisible to most Internet users, they provide critical
background functionality that permits websites to operate properly. [CR 42]

Go Daddy's involvement in this lawsuit derives exclusively from the fact
that defendant Hunter Taylor and a number of as of yet unidentified defendants

allegedly distributed photographs of Appellees on a website hosted by Go Daddy.
[CR 18 at 1 11] The First Amended Petition makes clear that Go Daddy is named

in this suit based solely on its role as the internet service provider hosting the
website and any revenue derived from that role. [CR 18-19 at ffl 11, 13]
The First Amended Petition does not allege, nor could it, that Go Daddy

participated in the creation or publication of the allegedly unlawful photographs
that are the subject of this lawsuit, nor does it allege any involvement in the
operation of the website at TEXXXAN.COM, other than the generic provision of
hosting

services

typical

of interactive

service

providers.

[CR

18-25]

Nonetheless, Appellees seek to hold Go Daddy liable for the alleged content posted
on the TEXXXAN.COM website by third parties. [CR 18-20 at ftf 11, 13, 15]

Appellees' original petition, filed on January 18, 2013, listed, without

factual support, a series of state law torts allegedly committed by the Defendants:

11

negligence, gross negligence, intrusion on the right to seclusion, public disclosure
of private facts, wrongful appropriation of names and likenesses, false light
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil

conspiracy.

[CR 5-15]

The original petition also singled out Go Daddy in a

separate claim for civil conspiracy. [CR 7-8 at ^[8] Before any party had answered
or otherwise responded to the Complaint, on February 11, 2013, Appellees filed
their First Amended Petition.

[CR 16] The principal substantive change in the

First Amended Petition is that it identifies a previous Doe defendant. ICR 16] The
First Amended Petition remains devoid of factual allegations against Go Daddy.
[CR 16-29]

On March 8, 2013, Go Daddy filed a motion to dismiss Appellees' claims
pursuant to the newly enacted Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
[CR 37-57] The crux of Go Daddy's motion was (1) that the immunity afforded
Go

Daddy

as

an

Internet

service

provider under

Section

230

of the

Communications Decency Act ("CDA" ) barred each of Appellees' claims as a
matter of law in light of Appellees' admissions in their pleadings that Go Daddy
did not control, create, develop, or publish the content at issue; and (2) even if

Appellees' claims were not barred by CDA immunity, Appellees nonetheless failed
to assert facts that, if true, state a claim against Go Daddy as a matter of law. [CR
37-57]
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On April 17, 2013, after briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied Go
Daddy's motion. [CR 99] On June 13, 2013, the trial court amended its order to
certify certain issues for interlocutory appeal.

ICR 165]

On or about June 26,

2013, and within fifteen (15) days of the trial court's execution of the Amended
Order, Go Daddy filed its Petition for Order Permitting Interlocutory Appeal from
the Amended Order ("Petition"). ICR 177] On or about July 26, 2013, this Court

granted the Petition and granted Go Daddy permission to proceed with filing an
interlocutory appeal from the Amended Order. [CR 178]
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

As recognized by this Court and other courts across the country, Section 230
of the CDA provides Internet service providers such as Go Daddy with broad

immunity from claims based on the alleged distribution of third-party content.'
Despite the fact that each of the elements establishing Go Daddy's right to
statutory immunity is apparent on the face of the First Amended Petition filed by
Appellees, the trial court denied Go Daddy's motion to dismiss pursuant to the
newly enacted Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Go Daddy respectfully requests
that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling.

This case presents the quintessential example of a suit barred as a matter of
law by Section 230. As addressed more thoroughly herein, Section 230 bars any
cause of action that seeks to hold an Internet service provider liable for content
created by a third-party user of the service or for the service provider's decision to
allow, edit, or remove that content. The trial court erred in refusing to grant Go
Daddy's motion to dismiss because Appellees' own allegations demonstrate that

Go Daddy is entitled to the statutory immunity afforded by Section 230.
First, Go Daddy, as the provider of an online hosting service with hundreds

of millions of users, clearly qualifies as an interactive computer service provider

that is eligible for the protection afforded by the statute. Appellees do not dispute

Section 230 includes several narrow exceptions from this immunity, none of
which are applicable here. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).

14

this point. Second, Appellees admit that the claims asserted are based solely on
third party content that Go Daddy did not control, create, develop or publish; as
such, the claims seek to impermissibly "treat" Go Daddy as a "publisher or
speaker" of that content.

Appellees cannot avoid the immunity afforded by Section 230 by baldly
asserting the existence of negligent or intentional conduct related to Go Daddy's

alleged failure to voluntarily undertake to identify, remove, and/or block the
content at issue.

As a number of courts facing identical fact patterns have

repeatedly held, Section 230 immunity may not be defeated through artful
pleading.

Instead, the analysis must focus on whether the elements of the

immunity are satisfied - as they are in this case.
The trial court also erred in refusing to grant Go Daddy's motion to dismiss

independent of the application of the immunity protections of Section 230.
Appellees cannot maintain a claim for civil conspiracy given their inability to
plead the facts necessary to maintain such a claim; indeed, the acts alleged as a

basis for Appellee's civil conspiracy claim against Go Daddy are alleged to have
been committed on the basis of negligence or gross negligence even though Texas

law prohibits use of negligence claims to support a civil conspiracy claim. Nor can

Appellees rely on their purported claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress to save their lawsuit from dismissal. In Texas, the use of such a "gap-

15

filler" tort is only permitted in those rare instances in which a defendant
intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the

victim has no other recognized theory of redress—a circumstance not presented
here. Appellees simply cannot state a claim against Go Daddy as a matter of law.
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying Go Daddy's motion
to dismiss the First Amended Petition and order the dismissal of Appellees' claims
against Go Daddy with prejudice.
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ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION

230

IMMUNIZES

INTERNET

SERVICE

PROVIDERS SUCH AS GO DADDY FROM LIABILITY FOR
THIRD-PARTY CONTENT

Section 230 offers Internet service providers absolute immunity against state
law claims arising from or relating to content created and/or published by third
parties.

The broad immunity afforded by Section 230 stems from the plain

language of the statute, which states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider," and that "[n]o cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that
is inconsistent with [section 230]." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3).

Together, these protections immunize providers of "interactive computer
services" and their users from causes of action asserted by persons alleging harm
caused by content supplied by others. See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[Section
230] was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication

and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.").

Congress recognized in enacting Section 230 what the U.S. Supreme Court later
confirmed in extending the highest level of First Amendment protection to the

17

Internet: "governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it." Reno, 521 U.S. at
885.

The policy motivations underlying the actions taken by Congress are written

directly into the law. Section 230 itself provides: "fi]t is the policy of the United
States [. . .] to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information received by individuals, families, and schools who

use the Internet and other interactive computer services" and "to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for Internet and other

interactive computers services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."

47

U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), (3). As Representative Christopher Cox noted in support of
the future statute, Section 230 was meant to "protect [online service providers]
from taking on liability . . . that they should not face ... for helping us solve this
problem" as well as establish a federal policy of non-regulation to "encourage what
is right now the most energetic technological revolution that any of us has ever
witnessed." 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
The concern that imposing potential liability on providers who host

thousands or even millions of websites might lead to overreaching moderation or
outright censorship is even more pressing today. When Section 230 was passed,
about 40 million people used the Internet worldwide, and commercial online

services in the United States had almost 12 million individual subscribers.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 850.

See

Today, the number of worldwide Internet users has

exploded to over 7 billion users.
In enacting Section 230, Congress recognized that imposing liability on
online intermediaries like Go Daddy for unlawful third-party content would
threaten the development of the online industry as a medium for new forms of
mass communication and would create disincentives to self-regulation of such
content by responsible service providers. As a result, Congress determined that
liability should rest with the actual wrongdoers—the originators of illegal and
harmful content—and not intermediary service providers, like Go Daddy, whose
systems are sometimes abused by such wrongdoers.

Since the enactment of Section 230, jurisdictions throughout the United
States have repeatedly held that any claim, intentional or otherwise, that treats an
Internet service provider as if it was the publisher of offensive content, such as that
at issue here, is barred by Section 230. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co.,
Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir.2000) ("47 U.S.C. § 230

creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold

computer service providers liable for information originating with a third party.");

See, e.g., List of countries by number of Internet users at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_Internet_users (last
visited on August 22,2013).
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Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1964, 2002 WL 31 844907,

at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) ("lA]ny claim made by the plaintiffs for damages or
injunctive relief with regard to either defamation and libel, or negligence and
fault[1, are precluded by the immunity afforded by Section 230(c)(1), and subject to
dismissal."). Indeed, courts have applied Section 230 to the very claims at issue

here:

negligence,3 invasion of privacy,4 infliction of emotional distress,5 and

injunctive relief.
The practical effect of Section 230 has been to "immunize providers of

interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material
disseminated by them but created by others." Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998); see also, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that

See, e^g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.
2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., 206 F.3d at 984-85; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332;
Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1013-17; Green, 318 F.3d at 468.

4

See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122: Barrett, 799 N.E.2d at 920;

Roskowski v. Corvallis Police Officers' Ass'n, No. Civ. 03-474-AS, 2005 WL
555398 (D. Or. March 9, 2005). '

5

See, e.%., Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711,713 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005); Jane

6

Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 26 1 F.Supp.2d 532, 540 (E.D. Va. 2003)

Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2000).

("[G]iven that the purpose of § 230 is to shield service providers from legal
responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be read to permit
claims that request only injunctive relief.'); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America
Online, Inc., No. 97-485 LH/LFG, 1999 WL 727402, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 1999)
("[T]he Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the Defendants continued publication
of inaccurate stock information. AOL is again entitled to Section 230 immunity
and this claim will be dismissed as well."), aff'd. 206 F.3d 980, 983-86 (10th Cir.
2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
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would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service.").

In particular, by mandating that providers of interactive

computer services are not to be treated as "publishers," the statute has served to bar
lawsuits "'seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.'" Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 50 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 330); see also Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., 2004 WL 5550485, at *6 (D.D.C.
May 17, 2004) (collecting cases supporting this proposition).

Several years ago, this Court joined the consensus developing among courts
across the country that Section 230(c) provides broad immunity to Internet service
providers publishing content provided primarily by third parties.

See Milo v.

Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (2010). As this Court explained in Milo, in the nearly 20
years since Section 230 was enacted, federal and state courts in jurisdictions across
the country "have applied [S]ection 230 broadly in addressing how the statute
operates to protect interactive computer services from suits based on an injury
caused by the computer-service provider's making third-party-provided content
publicly available on the internet."

Milo, 311 S.W.3d at 215 (discussing Fair

Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,

1167-68 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (defining the term "development" in 47
U.S.C.A. § 230(f)(3) "as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally,
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but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness")); Chi. Lawyers' Comm.

for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir.
2008) (upholding summary judgment because Section 230 prevented Craigslist
from being held liable as a "messenger" of posts containing allegedly
discriminatory sales and rental notices that pertained to housing); Universal
Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 416-22, 427 (1st Cir.2007)
(affirming dismissal of claims against internet service provider that were based on

defamatory posts by an anonymous user that appeared on the provider's message
boards); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1022, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Making
interactive computer services and their users liable for the speech of third parties
would severely restrict the information available on the Internet.

Section 230

therefore sought to prevent lawsuits from shutting down websites and other
services on the Internet."); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 469, 471

(3rd Cir.2003) (holding that AOL could not be held liable for an alleged negligent
failure to police its network for content provided by its users); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d

at 984-85 ("47 U.S.C. § 230 creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of
action that would hold computer service providers liable for information

originating with a third party."); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th

Cir. 1997) ("By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a
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third-party user of the service.").
For the same reasons set forth in Milo and the numerous other cases

applying Section 230, the claims contained in the First Amended Petition, each of
which would impose liability on Go Daddy for harms allegedly caused by thirdparty content, are barred by Section 230.
II.

GO

DADDY'S

ENTITLEMENT

TO

THE

IMMUNITY

PROTECTIONS OF SECTION 230 ARE APPARENT FROM
THE FACE OF THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION

As courts interpreting Section 230 have found, its breadth is clear and

unequivocal by its very terms:

"By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal

immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for

information originating with a third party user of the service." Zeran, 129 F. 3d at
330.

Courts have consistently applied its immunity broadly, not sparingly, to

encourage free speech on the Internet.

See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) ("To further the

policies underlying the CDA, courts have generally accorded § 230 immunity a
broad scope."); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Universal

Commun. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 415 (1st Cir. 2007); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).

The immunity granted by Section 230 is both procedural as well as
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substantive. That is, not only does the statute immunize providers from liability

based on its decisions surrounding its hosting of third party content, it immunizes
them from suit. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) ("No cause of action may be brought

and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section."); see also Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 ("Congress intended that
service providers ... be afforded immunity from suit"); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983
(holding Internet service provider "immune from suit under § 230").

This is

because legal protections that take force only after discovery would be of little

benefit to speakers since the vast majority of service providers will simply remove
speech instead of engaging in protracted and expensive fact-intensive legal battles,

a result that runs counter to Section 230's policy goals and undermines free
expression online. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254-255 ("[I]mmunity
is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability and it is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.").
Under the plain language of the statute, Section 230 immunity applies
whenever (1) the defendant claiming immunity is "a provider ... of an interactive
computer service," (2) the plaintiff's claims seek to "treat[]" the defendant as the

"publisher or speaker" of the allegedly harmful information at issue, and (3) that

information was "provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. §
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230(c)(1); see generally Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 984-85; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
Each of these elements is satisfied on the face of the First Amended Petition.

A.

The First Amended Petition Establishes that Go Daddy Is a
"Provider" of an "Interactive Computer Service"

Under Section 230, an "interactive computer service" includes "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
Based on the allegations made by Appellees in their own pleadings, Go

Daddy hosts the websites at TEXXXAN.COM.

[CR 18 at 111]

As a hosting

provider, Go Daddy permits its customers to purchase space on its servers for the
customers' data so that the data can be served to Internet users who are redirected

to any website hosted by Go Daddy. Indeed, Internet service providers such as Go
Daddy are routinely held to be interactive computer service providers for purposes
of Section 230.

See Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., CV08-0054-PHX-

SMM, 2008 WL 2705377 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2008) ("GoDaddy, as a web host,
qualifies as an interactive computer service provider under [Section 230]"); see

also, Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., 2002 WL 31844907, at *5 (finding that a
domain name registrar qualifies as an interactive computer service provider under
Section 230).
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In light of the allegations made by Appellees and the definition of
"interactive computer service provider" under Section 230, there can be no dispute
that Go Daddy is a provider of an "interactive computer service" -and is therefore
entitled to immunity under Section 230. Appellees do not make any argument to

the contrary. [CR 75-94]
B.

The Images at Issue Were "Information Provided By Another
Information Content Provider"

Each of the claims alleged against Go Daddy by Appellees is based on
harms that allegedly have been caused by material that was provided by "another
information content provider."

Section 230 defines an "information content

provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Appellees did not allege, nor
could they, that Go Daddy originated any of the images at issue or had any other
role in their "creation or development." Nor did Appellees allege that Go Daddy

was

responsible

for

uploading

the

allegedly

offending

content

on

the

TEXXXAN.COM website.

The First Amended Petition concedes that it was the individual defendants

and other unidentified individuals who uploaded the photographs to the Internet
and made them available at TEXXXAN.COM.
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[CR

18-19 at 1111-12]

Accordingly, all of the allegedly harmful information at issue in this case plainly
constitutes "information provided by another information content provider."

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (bogus and defamatory bulletin board postings created by
unauthorized users of the AOL service were "information provided by another
information content provider"); Green, 318 F.3d at 469 (content sent through chat
rooms deemed information provided by another information content provider);
Carafano., 339 F.3d at 1121, 1124 (bogus online profile, including photographs of

plaintiff, held to be information provided by another information content provider).
C.

The First Amended Petition Seeks to Treat Go Daddy as the
"Publisher or Speaker" of the Third-Party Information

As the case law confirms, a lawsuit that would impose liability on an

interactive service provider for allegedly harmful or unlawful third-party
information necessarily "treats" the service provider as the "publisher or speaker"
of that information in contravention of Section 230. See, e.g., Milo, 311 S.W.3d at
215; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986.

Thus, Section 230

"creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service

providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service."
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).

Courts have unanimously recognized that causes of action based on third-

party content are attempts to treat the service provider as a publisher of that content
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regardless of the particular label placed on the claim. Indeed, courts have applied
7

Section 230 to the very tort claims at issue here: negligence, invasion of privacy,

R

and infliction of emotional distress.9 Claims for equitable relief also are barred by
the CDA. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540
(E.D. Va. 2003) ("[G]iven that the purpose of § 230 is to shield service providers
from legal responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be

read to permit claims that request only injunctive relief"), aff'd, No. 03-1770,
2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004); Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., 2002

WL 31844907, at *5 ("[Alny claim made by the plaintiffs for damages or
injunctive relief with regard to either defamation and libel, or negligence and
fault [], are precluded by the immunity afforded by Section 230(c)(1), and subject to
dismissal."); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., No. 97-485

LH/LFG, 1999 WL 727402, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 1999) ("[T]he Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief from the Defendants continued publication of inaccurate stock
information. AOL is again entitled to Section 230 immunity and this claim will be

'

See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122: Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 984-85; Zeran,

129 F.3d at 332; Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1013-17; Green, 318 F.3d at 468.

8See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122; Barrett, 799 N.E.2d at 920; Roskowski v.
Corvallis Police Officers Assn, No. Civ. 03-474-AS, 2005 WL 555398 (D. Or.
March 9, 2005).

9See, e.g., Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005); Jane Doe
One v. Oliver. 755 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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dismissed as well."), aff'd, 206 F.3d 980, 983-86 (10th Cir. 2000), cert, denied,
531 U.S. 824(2000).

Appellees' attempt to circumvent Section 230 by alleging "civil conspiracy,"
likewise is unavailing.

A claim for civil conspiracy requires an agreement to

commit a tort, and "[a]bsent the underlying tort, there can be no liability for civil

conspiracy." Bank One, Texas v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 446 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998). Because each of the alleged torts themselves require treating Go Daddy as

a publisher, any civil conspiracy claim based on those torts amounts to the same
claim.

Like other claims against interactive computer service providers discussed in

the case law, the allegations in the First Amended Petition here seek to "treat" Go
Daddy as the "publisher or speaker" of third party content in at least three ways.
First, the First Amended Petition demonstrably seeks to treat Go Daddy as the

"publisher or speaker" of third-party content because it would "cast [Go Daddy] in
the same position as the party who originally posted the offensive" material."
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. In particular, Appellees seek to hold Go Daddy liable on
the same basic theory of harm and causation that they assert against the various
individual defendants - the third parties who, according to Appellees, uploaded the

illegal photographs to the TEXXXAN.COM website, which have caused them
harm. [CR 18-22 at flll, 14-17] Appellees essentially allege that (i) sexually
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explicit images of them were made available to others online, and that (ii) they
suffered damages as a result. [CR 18-22 at HI 1, 14-17] This is precisely the type
of claim that should be brought against the originators of the content in question,

and indeed, is brought against the originators of the content in question in this case.
Appellees' claims therefore "treat" Go Daddy the same as the original publishers
of the harmful information.

The Fourth Circuit in Zeran relied on precisely this reasoning in holding that
Section 230 barred claims that aimed to make an Internet service provider liable
for tortious content that a user had repeatedly posted on one of its electronic fora:

According to Zeran's logic, AOL is legally at fault because it
communicated to third parties an allegedly defamatory
statement. This is precisely the theory under which the original
poster of the offensive messages would be found liable. If the
original party is considered a publisher of the offensive
messages, Zeran certainly cannot attach liability to AOL under
the same theory without conceding that AOL too must be
treated as a publisher of the statements.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.

Second, Appellees' claims would explicitly impose on Go Daddy the
"quintessential duties" of a publisher, including the duties to block, screen, warn

against, or edit the allegedly harmful material, in violation of Section 230's

prohibition on "publisher" liability. As the Fourth Circuit held in Zeran, any claim
based on a service provider's alleged failure to "exercise . . . a publisher's
traditional editorial functions," such as monitoring or screening other parties'
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transmissions or deciding whether to withdraw or delete content, necessarily and
impermissibly treats the provider as a publisher of that information. Zeran, 129
F.3d at 330; see also Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986 ("Congress clearly enacted § 230

to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise
of its . . . self-regulatory functions."). Appellees in this case explicitly seek to hold
Go Daddy liable for failing to engage in these self-regulatory activities to a degree

Appellees deem adequate. By treating all of the defendants collectively, the First
Amended Petition rests on Go Daddy's alleged failures to fulfill the quintessential
duties of a publisher to ensure that the content that is published is not tortious or
otherwise unlawful. Section 230, however, forbids the imposition of civil liability
on an interactive computer service provider such as Go Daddy for such alleged
failures where, as here, the content in question originated with a third party. See
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986

Third, the suit seeks to treat Go Daddy as the publisher of third-party content
because the essence of each of the counts asserted against Go Daddy is that it

"published" illegal images of Appellees and thereby caused them harm.

In the

First Amended Petition, Appellees accuse Go Daddy of conspiring to publish the
photographs that allegedly appeared on TEXXXAN.COM.

[CR 19 at 113]

In

spite of this, the First Amended Petition admits that the alleged photographs were

31

actually posted by the individual defendants, i.e., third party content providers, not
Go Daddy. [CR 18-19 at HI 1, 12]
Even Appellees' purported negligence claim—predicated on a "failure to

remove" the offending website—falls squarely within the ambit of traditional

publisher liability.

See, e.g., Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591

(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Deciding whether or not to remove content or deciding when to

remove content falls squarely within Ask.com's exercise of a publisher's
traditional role and is therefore subject to the CDA's broad immunity.");
Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., , 2002 WL 31844907, at ^10-11 ("The defendant

is immunized from liability for this state claim of negligence because the defendant
meets the three requirements of the CDA immunity.").

The First Amended

Petition makes clear on its face that Appellees' claims against Go Daddy seek to
treat Go Daddy as the "publisher" of third-party content in contravention of
Section 230.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of decisional law from other

jurisdictions to this Appeal, especially given the lack of Texas state court cases

addressing the issues of whether, when, and to which type of state law claims

immunity under Section 230 of the CDA applies. In Milo, notably the only Texas
Court of Appeals decision to confront the issue of CDA immunity, this Court did
not resolve the question of whether intentional tort claims under Texas law are
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barred by such immunity.'0 See id. at 215 ("[W]e find no reported Texas opinion
that has addressed whether section 230 preempts Texas defamation law relating to
situations involving internet service providers who provide access to defamatory
third-party created content."). In affirming the trial court's grant of a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment, this Court expressly stated that while such a claim

may "arguably not [be] within the reach of the Communications Decency Act of
1996" or its immunity to Internet service providers under Section 230, whether "an

intentional infliction claim is available as a remedy [is] a matter we need not
decide." Id. at 217.

The decision in Milo also highlights a critical distinction between the facts in

Milo and the facts admitted by Appellees: the Internet service provider's lack of
control over the content at issue. In Milo, the website defendant had control of the

content at issue. Id. at 211. While Judge Gwaltney recognized in his concurring

opinion that CDA immunity may not bar a claim for intentional acts, he expressly
recognized that "liability of a website operator for intentional action that injures

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also

addressed the issue of CDA immunity, but only in the context of whether the CDA
completely preempted all state law claims. Recognizing that the immunity did not
apply to those responsible for creating or developing content, the court held,
consistent with authorities throughout the United States, that the CDA did not

completely preempt all state law claims. See Cisnews v. Sanchez, 403 F.Supp.2d

588, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (remanding case removed by defendant on claim of

federal preemption). The court did not, however, identify which, if any, state law
claims were beyond the reach of CDA immunity against a hostins provider such as

Go Daddy or the circumstances in which such immunity woulcl be inapplicable
under Texas law.
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another may be based on, and is limited by, the website operator's control over the

website material." Id. at 222 (emphasis added) (D. Gwaltney, concurring).
In the instant case, Appellees admit that Go Daddy did nothing more than
provide hosting services to the website operator. [CR 18-19 at If 11, 13; 60 at 113]
On these facts, taken as true pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure for purposes of Go Daddy's motion to dismiss, the trial court's denial is

inconsistent with both Section 230 and the legal standard set forth in Rule 91a.
Instead, the trial court's denial of Go Daddy's motion effectively establishes that
Go Daddy is not entitled to statutory immunity under Section 230.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 91a by its very nature challenges the
sufficiency of the claims asserted by Appellees as a matter of law and accepts all
allegations as true. Appellees assert seven intentional torts and two claims of gross
negligence against Go Daddy based solely on Go Daddy's provision of Internet

hosting services. [CT 16-29] Appellees readily admit and the trial courtfound
that Go Daddy did not control, create, develop, or publish the offending content at
issue.

[CR 18-19 at 1111,13; 165]

Based on Appellees' own allegations and

admissions, application of the immunity provided to Internet service providers
under Section 230 bars their claims against Go Daddy as a matter of law.

Because the claims against Go Daddy fall squarely within the protections of
Section 230(c) immunity as a matter of law, this Court should reverse the trial
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court's order denying Go Daddy's motion to dismiss and order the dismissal of
Appellees' claims against Go Daddy with prejudice.
III.

THE SINGLE CLAIM FOR CIVIL CONSPIRACY ASSERTED
AGAINST

GO

DADDY

FAILS

INDEPENDENT

OF

THE

IMMUNITY PROVIDED BY SECTION 230.

Even independent of the broad immunity granted to interactive service
providers by Section 230, the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the sole claim
for civil conspiracy asserted by Appellees against Go Daddy because it has no
basis in law or fact.

Appellees assert a single claim for civil conspiracy against Go Daddy.
Appellees make clear that the civil conspiracy claim leveled against Go Daddy is
based solely on the provision of automated website hosting services provided to

TEXXXAN.COM, which they claim allowed the individual defendants to
"accomplish the torts" set forth in the First Amended Petition. [CR 19 at 113]
To establish a claim for civil conspiracy in Texas, a plaintiff must show: (1)

two or more persons; (2) an objective to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the
minds on the objective; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) proximate
damages. See Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983). Yet

the First Amended Petition is devoid of any allegations to support these elements
as to Go Daddy, let alone any of the other defendants.
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More problematic for Appellees, however, is the fact that under Texas law,
civil conspiracy is a derivative tort. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681

(Tex. 1996). If a plaintiff fails to state a separate underlying claim on which the
court may grant relief, then a claim for civil conspiracy necessarily fails. See id.
Thus, whether Appellees stated a claim for civil conspiracy rises or falls on
whether they stated a claim against Go Daddy on an underlying tort.

Appellees allege that Go Daddy conspired to commit negligence, gross
negligence, and the "negligent and grossly negligent commission of Texas state
law torts of intrusion on their right to seclusion, public disclosure of their private

facts, the wrongful appropriation of their names and likenesses, false light,11
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress"
115].

ICR 20 at

Texas law, however, prohibits civil conspiracy claims founded on

negligence claims. See Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716,

719-20 (Tex. 1995) (holding that given requirement of specific intent in civil
conspiracy, parties cannot engage in civil conspiracy to be negligent). As such,

Appellees' conspiracy claim fails as to each of the negligence-based tort claims
asserted.

Notablv, Texas does not recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy.

See Cain v. 'Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).
purported "false light" claim fails.
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As such, Appellees'

With regard to the single claim of intentional conduct asserted in the First
Amended Petition—intentional infliction of emotional distress—Appellees again

fail to sufficiently allege an underlying tort upon which to base their claim for civil

conspiracy against Go Daddy. Under Texas law, intentional infliction of emotional
distress "is a 'gap-filler' tort, created to permit recovery in those rare instances in
which a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so

unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress." Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). As a consequence,

Texas courts routinely dismiss intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
where, as here, "the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint is another tort . . .

regardless of whether the plaintiff succeeds on, or even makes the alternate claim."
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 448; see also Creditwatch, Inc. v.
Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. 2005) ("As [the plaintiffs] complaints are

covered by other statutory remedies, she cannot assert them as intentional infliction
claims just because those avenues may now be barred.").

Here Appellees1 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
predicated on exactly the same conduct underlying their negligence, gross

negligence, and negligent invasion of privacy claims. [CT 18-21 at H10-15] The
fact that those claims may ultimately be barred as to Go Daddy does not provide

Appellees with this alternative avenue of recourse.
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In light of the fact that (1) Appellees cannot maintain a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress in this action, (2) the remaining claims asserted in

the First Amended Petition as a basis for the civil conspiracy claim against Go
Daddy are alleged to have been committed on the basis of negligence or gross
negligence, and (3) Texas law prohibits use of negligence claims to support a civil
conspiracy claim, Appellees failed to state a claim against Go Daddy as a matter of
law. This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying Go Daddy's motion

to dismiss the First Amended Petition and order the dismissal of Appellees' claims
against Go Daddy with prejudice.
IV.

APPELLEES OWN ADMISSIONS BAR THE CLAIMS TO BE
ASSERTED

RENDERING

ANY

FURTHER

AMENDMENT

FUTILE

It is anticipated that Appellees will argue that, in the event the Court
reverses and remands the trial courts order, Appellees be given a further
opportunity to amend. In light of the admissions made by Plaintiffs, such an
opportunity would be futile.

"Where the proffered amended complaint would be futile, in that it fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, leave to amend may be denied."
Clauder v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 805 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Tex. 1992). Here,

Appellees readily admit and the trial courtfound that Go Daddy did not control,
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create, develop, or publish the offending content at issue. [CR 18-19 at HI 1, 13;

165] Based on Appellees' own allegations and admissions, they simply cannot
plead or recast their allegations into a cognizable claim against Go Daddy as a
matter of law and leave to file a further amended pleading should be denied
outright.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's order

denying Go Daddy's motion to dismiss and order the dismissal of Appellees'
claims against Go Daddy with prejudice.
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